Recommendations and alternatives are provided that while general in nature, should provide fodder for the generation of other new ideas and discussion.
In the case of Army field artillery modernization we are continuing down the path of the past by continuing to justify expensive new systems based on the need to fight battles we will likely never see again, the need to destroy massed tank and infantry formations. This is similar to the Air Forces continued support for buying the expensive B-2 bomber even thought the Cold War ended and the need for a penetrating strategic bomber went away. In both these cases the underlying requirements changed yet we continue to use scarce resources to build technological marvels that provide little to no useful military utility for combat in the 21 st Century as witnessed in Bosnia, Haiti, and now Yugoslavia/Kosovo.
21
ST CENTURY GEO-STRATEGIC TRENDS GLOBAL TRENDS.
The first key trend is globalization. This trend is bringing citizens from all nations closer together, provides increased idea sharing and goods transfers and the rapid dissemination of information.
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A second key trend is continuing population growth, particularly in the developing world (Asia, Africa, Latin American, etc). This growth in population fuels the continued urbanization of the world, crowding people into megacities.
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The third trend is the worldwide collapse of less well developed states into internecine or internal wars due to economic stagnation, ethnic, or religious disputes in less developed nations.
5
We have seen these trends multiple times in such places as Bosina,-Rwanda, Zaire, Somalia, or in the case of the Russians in Grozny.
INFORMATION DISSEMINTON -THE CNN EFFECT.
A recent phenomena born during the Gulf War and getting more powerful is the ability of television and other information conduits to show in real-time the effects of war and humanitarian crises. This information revolution has two major impacts on U.S. The most likely areas for conflicts to occur that will require U.S. engagement are on the periphery of Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. 26 We can also expect that no nation, will directly challenge us on the battlefield like Saddam
Hussein did in the Gulf War, as few leaders will make this mistake in the future. 27 These conflicts will normally occur in developing areas of the world that are being increasingly urbanized, with large, generally poor, civilian populations that have limited/lowquality infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, buildings), except for the ability to disseminate information (e.g., TV, phone, fax, internet). All these trends have occurred in our numerous recent operations in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and our continued efforts against Iraq.
THE ROLE OF THE KING OF BATTLE -FIELD ARTILLERY
MISSION. It is an area fire weapon. However point targets can be destroyed by special munitions.
-Limited ability to survive enemy ground, air, and artillery attacks.
Best employed when massed on observed targets.
.-' Must be integrated with the maneuver plan. Table 1 ) and identifies weapons delivery systems to suppress, neutralize or destroy these target categories using the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology. 35 What is missing from current doctrine is planning for small-scale contingency efforts. 
FIELD ARTILLERY MODERINZATION DEVELOPMENTS
The Army has developed an overall modernization plan that lays out how it plans to invest its resources to ensure tomorrow's soldiers are ready for war. Lets now take a brief look at the emerging fire support systems being modernized, the essential research and development and leapahead technology being pursued.
ARTILLERY WEAPON SYSTEMS

PALADIN.
The improved Paladin 155-mm self-propelled howitzer is being fielded now with completion expected by the year 2000. This system has improved computer and navigation system, automatic gun positioning and improved ballistic and NBC protection. The system weights 32 tons, has a firing range of 30 km, fires at rates of up 39 to 4 rounds/min and is accurate to 155 meters CEP.
CRUSADER.
The Crusader is a new system under development to provide a stateof-the-art 155-mm self-propelled howitzer that is highly survivable and capable of providing direct and indirect fire support at ranges (40-50 km), fire rates (10-12 rounds/minute) and accuracy (80 meter CEP) beyond any other cannon system. The key technologies involved in this system are an integral mid-wall cooled cannon, modular charge system, automated ammo handling, and enhanced survivability.
The system weights over 50 tons and only one system is transportable per C-17 or C-5 sortie. As part of the program a separate armored resupply vehicle is also being developed to provide automatic ammo resupply, fuel transfer, and improved mobility. The planned fielding date for the system is 2005. This system is going to be a technology carrier for other future ground weapon systems.
LIGHTWEIGH HOWITZER.
The Lightweight 155 howitzer (LW155) provides increased strategic and tactical mobility, increased rate of fire,' and survivability over our current M198 towed system. This system is capable of :
self-locating itself and is digitized to the same capability as our current self-propelled howitzers.
ROCKET ARTILLERY SYSTEMS
MLRS.
The Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is an artillery weapon capable of delivering large volumes of firepower in a short time against critical, time sensitive targets. The systems basic rocket warhead carries improved conventional submunitions, but the system is also capable of delivering any of the MLRS family of munitions.
The MLRS weights about 28 tons and was capable of keeping up with the tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles during Desert Storm.
Currently the system is being upgraded with an improved fire control system and enhanced launcher mechanical system to provide more rapid response times to time-sensitive targets.
MLRS Extended-Range Rocket System.
This is an evolution to the basic MLRS rocket design to provide longer range and lower submunition dud rate. This is a freeflight, area-fire, artillery rocket capable of engaging targets out to 45 kilometers. The new submuntion fuze reduces the danger of residual duds to friendly troops. Initial fielding of these rockets is planned for 2000.
MLRS Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket system (GMLRS).
This program continues, to upgrade the current MLRS rocket and builds off the extended-range rocket. This upgrade transforms the free-flight MLRS rocket into a missile by adding a guidance and control package using an inertial measurement unit (aided by the global positioning system) to provide increased accuracy. The range of the system is increased to 60 kilometers. Production for this MLRS variant is scheduled to start in 2002.
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
The ATACMS Block I and IA provides division and corps commanders a long-range, surface-to-surface missile system for attacking targets at ranges between 165km to 300km. Manufacturing Development phase in 1999.
High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).
HIMARS is a lighter weight, more deployable MLRS system mounted on ä medium tactical vehicle that is C-13Ö transportable and provides light forces with MLRS capability. The system is capable of launching the complete MLRS family of munitions to include all ATACMS variants. Currently prototype systems are undergoing evaluation with production planned to start in 2004.
Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) are fire and forget smart munitions capable of detecting and destroying armored vehicles.
This program enters full rate production in 1999. There is also a preplanned product improvement (P3I) program to enhance SADARM performance that provides improved sensor capabilities (Laser Radar/Infrared) and greater lethal area coverage (doubles effectiveness of current SADARM projectile).
XM982.
This is an extended range, rocket-assisted, 155mm dual-purpose improved conventional munition that begins production in 2003.
This new round provides increased ranges from 28 to 39 kms for current systems and a boost from 38 to 47 kms for the Crusader system.
EFOG-M.
The Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile system is not discussed in the artillery modernization plan, but is capable of providing indirect fire support. Currently the system is being looked at as an antitank system as part of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The EFOG-M system is mounted on a HMMWV, uses a two-man crew, and provides a day/night non-line-of-sight capability to defeat high-value targets. The operator flies the missile to the target via a fiber optic cable, is able to perform reconnaissance while flying to the target and has a FLIR/TV sensor for target acquisition and identification at endgame. The system is lightweight (air assault capable), capable of operating in poor weather conditions, and has a range of 15 kms.
COMMAND/CONTROL (C2) AND SENSORS.
The fire support modernization plan also provides new systems like the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), new observer vehicles like the STRIKER and BFIST, and improved target detection radars. 
FIELD ARTILLERY GOALS VS. REALITY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Let us now look at some recommendations and alternatives to better align field artillery modernization with U.S. military strategy and reguirements so we get usable systems for army operations in the 21 st Century. The discussion of proposed recommendations and alternatives will use the Army Requirements Determination process (i.e., doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldier structure (DTLOMS)) as a guide.
DOCTRINE.
Before we begin the material development process we need to develop new fire support doctrine that matches our 21 st Century warfighting TRAINING.
Once we address the doctrinal void in field artillery operations we need to develop exercises and training scenarios to prepare our forces for use under actual conditions. We need to put a civilian urban area on the ground at the NTC where the artillery community has to address how they will minimize collateral damage. Our training exercises will need to address our ability to achieve first round hits on targets with very small errors -precision engagement. This type of training is not currently being conducted at our combat training centers so how will we do it under operational conditions?
ORGANIZATION.
Here is where we could make some major changes in how we achieve our field artillery objectives, especially if we step back, challenge a few basic assumptions and are willing to take a more total force/Joint view.
If we look at the key generic requirements for field artillery in Staff, 1996 for a penetrating strategic bomber went away. In our case the world is changing, too, and we must have the courage to question' whether, like the B-2, the requirement for a new field artillery gun that provides high rates of generally inaccurate fire (i.e., CEP of 80 meters) is valid. Like the Air Force, when the subject of whether the Crusader is really needed comes up, our answer tends to be that the Crusader is a technology carrier for future land combat systems. The assumption underlying this assertion is that our future still lies in a tank like force of tracked vehicles. We need to understand that adoption of this line of thinking probably cuts off consideration of ideas like armored hovercraft, or even more futuristic ideas like null-gravity vehicles.
The risk we take in deferring any major modernization effort for field artillery is low as doctrinal and organizational changes, albeit with some political baggage, can provide us the type of fire support needed in the near term to support SSC operations and major theater wars. In addition, we have bought sufficient numbers of MLRS systems to provide the massed firepower needed to destroy massed enemy tank and infantry battlefield formations if that unlikely contingency occurs. We are also continuing to improve our MLRS system's capability (current field artillery modernization plan increases range, mobility and accuracy) to destroy tanks and APC's so why another new system?
Since we are in a period of strategic pause and we have ways to counter the full spectrum of threats envisioned we need to rethink our field artillery modernization plans. As showed above our stated goals and modernization strategy do not match. We are stating the right things but when you look at where we are investing it is still based on fighting the cold war threat. 19 Novemeber 1998, p. 19. 12 Military necessity: this principle justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.
13 Discrimination: The necessity for distinguishing between combatants, who may be attacked, and noncombatahts, e.g., civilians, who ma not be attacked. A customary international law principle prohibiting the intentional attack of civilians. FM 27-10, para 40.
14 Proportionality: The loss of life and damage to proptery incidental to military action must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. para 41. 
